Operation Epic Fury Objectives Tracker

Status Definitions

Achieved

The stated condition is independently supported.

Substantially achieved

Independent evidence supports overwhelming achievement or degradation, but not literal total elimination.

Partially achieved

Measurable progress occurred, but meaningful capability remains.

Not achieved

The observable condition has not occurred.

Reversed

A condition previously declared achieved later reappeared or ceased to hold.

Unresolved

Available evidence cannot establish the condition, especially for enduring objectives.

Insufficient independent evidence

An official claim exists but outside evidence is inadequate.

Military Objectives

• Destroy/degrade ballistic missile capability

  Partially achieved

  First stated: March 2, 2026 — President Donald Trump

  U.S. claim

  The administration said missile capabilities, launchers and much of the relevant industrial base were destroyed or heavily degraded.

  Official sources: [472] [474]

  Independent evidence

  CENTCOM's April 6 fact sheet reported more than 13,000 targets struck, including ballistic-missile sites and manufacturing facilities. Independent analysis by CSIS confirmed substantial physical damage but cited assessments that Iran retained about 70 percent of its prewar missile stockpile, indicating extensive degradation rather than elimination.

  Independent sources: [476] [477] [478]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would lack a meaningful ability to launch ballistic missiles against U.S. forces, partners or regional targets, and the capability would remain suppressed after major combat operations end.

• Destroy/degrade long-range drone capability

  Partially achieved

  First stated: March 4, 2026 — Secretary Pete Hegseth / Gen. Dan Caine

  U.S. claim

  The April declaration said the majority of long-range attack drones and related industrial capacity had been destroyed.

  Official sources: [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  CSIS analysis found damage to drone-production facilities and equipment but cited assessments that Iran retained about 40 percent of its prewar drone arsenal, supporting substantial degradation but not elimination of the inventory.

  Independent sources: [477] [478]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would no longer retain a militarily significant long-range drone inventory or a near-term ability to replenish it.

• Destroy missile/drone production and defense-industrial capacity

  Substantially achieved

  First stated: March 2, 2026 — President Trump and senior administration officials

  U.S. claim

  The White House claimed more than 85 percent of the defense industrial base had been destroyed.

  Official sources: [472] [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  CSIS found that Iran would need replacement machine tools, drone components, marine engines and other imported or dual-use goods to rebuild, and identified plausible alternate procurement routes through Pakistan, the Caspian region and China. This supports substantial physical destruction while leaving the underlying reconstitution question open.

  Independent sources: [476] [477]

  What fulfillment requires

  The relevant production network would be unable to manufacture militarily significant replacement missiles, drones, launchers and associated systems.

• Destroy the Iranian navy

  Substantially achieved

  First stated: March 2, 2026 — President Trump

  U.S. claim

  The administration declared the navy obliterated and reported 150 warships destroyed and every submarine sunk.

  Official sources: [472] [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  CENTCOM reported more than 155 vessels damaged or destroyed by April 6, and independent commercial-satellite analysis by CSIS subsequently found the loss of nearly all of Iran's conventional naval surface fleet along with extensive damage to naval bases and shipyards. This is one of the clearest cases where official claims and outside physical evidence substantially align.

  Independent sources: [476] [477]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran's conventional naval forces would remain unable to conduct meaningful fleet operations or rapidly regenerate those forces.

• Eliminate/neutralize the Iranian Air Force

  Substantially achieved

  First stated: March 20, 2026 — President Trump; later reiterated by Secretary Rubio

  U.S. claim

  The White House said Iranian air forces were functionally neutralized and no longer flying.

  Official sources: [472]

  Independent evidence

  An August 2026 IISS assessment found that the Iranian Air Force was unable to present a credible air-to-air threat during the campaign. U.S. forces were able to employ MQ-9 aircraft extensively for surveillance and air-to-surface attacks over Iran. This independently supports operational neutralization of Iran's air-to-air capability more clearly than it supports literal destruction of every Iranian air asset.

  Independent sources: [492]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would remain unable to mount a credible air-to-air or offensive fixed-wing challenge to U.S. operations and regional partners.

• Eliminate/degrade Iranian air defenses

  Partially achieved

  First stated: March 20, 2026 — President Trump / later CENTCOM operational claims

  U.S. claim

  CENTCOM and the White House described extensive destruction of air-defense systems.

  Official sources: [472] [476]

  Independent evidence

  CSIS assessed during the campaign that degradation of Iranian air defenses allowed U.S. aircraft to operate with few limitations over large portions of Iran. Later IISS analysis found that Iran nevertheless retained pockets of effective ground-based air defense, which destroyed more than two dozen U.S. MQ-9s. The evidence therefore supports substantial degradation but not elimination of Iran's air-defense network.

  Independent sources: [492] [493]

  What fulfillment requires

  Surviving systems would no longer pose a meaningful threat to U.S. aircraft or enable Iran to rebuild an integrated defensive network quickly.

• Prevent rapid military reconstitution

  Unresolved

  First stated: March 4, 2026 — Gen. Dan Caine

  U.S. claim

  The defense-industrial campaign was explicitly intended to stop Iran from rebuilding external power-projection capability.

  Official sources: [472] [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  CSIS identified specific inputs Iran would need to rebuild — replacement machine tools, drone components, marine engines and salvage equipment — and plausible alternate procurement routes through Pakistan, the Caspian region and China. Because reconstitution is a forward-looking condition rather than a one-time destruction target, it can only be assessed over time rather than confirmed at a single point.

  Independent sources: [477]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would remain unable over time to replace lost inventories and production capacity through domestic rebuilding, imports or alternate procurement routes.

• Permanently deny Iran a nuclear weapon

  Unresolved

  First stated: March 2, 2026 — President Trump; repeatedly stated by Hegseth and others

  U.S. claim

  The administration described permanent nuclear denial as a core objective.

  Official sources: [472] [473] [474]

  Independent evidence

  The IAEA had already lost continuity of knowledge over key elements of Iran's nuclear program, including centrifuge production and inventories, before the war. Independent arms-control analysis after the fighting concluded that key nuclear materials, technologies and institutional knowledge survived and that airstrikes alone could not create a durable verification regime. Satellite analysis of increased construction at Pickaxe Mountain neither proves nor disproves that centrifuges were relocated there.

  Independent sources: [488] [489] [490]

  What fulfillment requires

  Nuclear material would be accounted for; enrichment and centrifuge capabilities would be constrained or verifiably disabled; undeclared activity could be detected; and a monitoring/verification system would make future weaponization detectable early enough to respond.

Strategic Objectives

• Stop Iran from arming, funding and directing armed proxies

  Not achieved

  First stated: March 2, 2026 — President Trump

  U.S. claim

  On April 8 the White House said Iran could no longer arm terrorist proxies.

  Official sources: [472] [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  In September, Reuters reported, citing Iranian, Yemeni and regional sources, that Iranian funding, weapons, advisers and Revolutionary Guard personnel continued supporting Houthi operations in Yemen. Iran denied directly directing Houthi military operations, and days later G7 foreign ministers publicly called on Iran to stop arming and supporting the Houthis. The Reuters reporting should remain attributed to its sources rather than treated as fully independent proof of every alleged transfer.

  Independent sources: [486] [487]

  What fulfillment requires

  Sustained evidence that Iranian weapons, financing, advisers and operational support to armed regional partners have ceased or fallen below the capability contemplated by the administration's objective.

• Prevent meaningful Iranian power projection outside its borders

  Not achieved

  First stated: March 4, 2026 — Gen. Dan Caine

  U.S. claim

  The April declaration said destruction of the defense industrial base had eliminated Iran's ability to project power.

  Official sources: [472] [474] [475]

  Independent evidence

  CSIS's reconstitution analysis indicates Iran retains plausible pathways to rebuild military-industrial capacity, and later Reuters reporting on continued Iranian support for Houthi operations in Yemen indicates Iran retained some ability to project influence beyond its borders through proxies even after the declared military objectives were announced achieved.

  Independent sources: [477] [486]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would remain unable to conduct or materially support significant military operations beyond its borders after U.S. combat operations end.

• Preserve freedom and safety of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz

  Not achieved

  First stated: March 10, 2026 — Gen. Dan Caine / CENTCOM

  U.S. claim

  CENTCOM repeatedly said U.S. operations were intended to sustain commercial movement and protect civilian mariners.

  Official sources: [472] [480] [483]

  Independent evidence

  On September 21, preliminary shipping data recorded only two commodity vessels crossing Hormuz, compared with a prewar average of roughly 125 large commercial vessels per day. Reuters cautioned that vessels operating without AIS transmissions mean the figures are not exhaustive, but the data indicates commercial navigation remained severely disrupted even after the conventional Iranian navy was substantially destroyed.

  Independent sources: [484] [491]

  What fulfillment requires

  Commercial traffic would return to reasonably normal, secure passage without requiring repeated combat operations to keep the route usable.

• Enforce blockade of Iranian ports

  Substantially achieved

  First stated: April 12, 2026 — CENTCOM under presidential direction

  U.S. claim

  CENTCOM reported redirecting or disabling noncompliant vessels and restricting trade into and out of Iranian ports.

  Official sources: [480] [481] [482]

  Independent evidence

  Independent industry data showed Iranian crude loadings collapsing from roughly 2 million barrels per day in March to about 220,000-255,000 barrels per day in August, supporting the claim that the blockade has been operationally effective at restricting Iranian port traffic.

  Independent sources: [485]

  What fulfillment requires

  The blockade would continue to prevent prohibited maritime traffic for as long as the administration defines the blockade as necessary; this is an ongoing operation rather than a finite destruction target.

• Place Iran in a position of unconditional surrender

  Not achieved

  First stated: March 6, 2026 — President Trump

  U.S. claim

  President Trump said there would be no deal with Iran except unconditional surrender. The White House subsequently explained that Iran would essentially be in such a position when the president determined that Iran no longer posed a threat to the United States and the objectives of Operation Epic Fury had been fully realized.

  Official sources: [494] [495]

  Independent evidence

  The administration's definition made unconditional surrender a broader strategic end-state condition rather than necessarily requiring a formal surrender document. As of the evidence cutoff, several conditions incorporated into that definition remained unresolved or unfulfilled, including freedom of navigation through Hormuz, permanent nuclear denial and the broader durable end state.

  Independent sources: [491]

  What fulfillment requires

  Iran would have to meet the administration's stated surrender condition: no longer posing the threat contemplated by the administration and fulfillment of the objectives of Operation Epic Fury, whether or not that condition were accompanied by a formal surrender document.

• Reach a durable end to hostilities / settlement

  Not achieved

  First stated: Evolved during ceasefire and negotiation phases — President Trump and administration negotiators

  U.S. claim

  The April ceasefire was presented as the basis for a broader peace agreement.

  Official sources: [475]

  Independent evidence

  No durable settlement had been documented by the evidence cutoff. Continued disruption to Hormuz shipping and continued Iranian proxy support reported in September indicate that a stable, comprehensive end state had not been reached, though the ceasefire itself has held without a return to full-scale combat.

  Independent sources: [491]

  What fulfillment requires

  An agreement or stable end state would have to persist without recurring U.S.-Iran combat and while preserving the administration's core security objectives.